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(1953). In State v. Wisman, 98 W. Va. 250, 126 S.E. 703 (1925),
it was held error to refuse the instruction that one cannot be found
guilty of any offense higher or greater than that offense found by
the first jury. This same principle was applied in Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), principally the case from which the
reasoning was drawn in reaching the decision in the instant case.
The Green case followed the view that is most consistent with
the philosophy of the criminal law in not subjecting the defendant
to repeated abuse and embarrassment, and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of insecurity and anxiety.
The principal case illustrates the growing concern of the federal
judiciary with the standards of criminal practice and procedure
in the state courts. In view of the Supreme Court's present disposi-
tion to broaden the scope of the federal Bill of Rights so as to
embrace more and more state actions, it would appear prudent for
all state courts, prosecutors and law enforcement officials to follow
closely the established federal procedures. The failure to do so
carries with it the strong possibility of future reversals and the un-
necessary release of hardened criminals.
John I. Rogers, 1I
Constitutional Law-Voluntary Confession
D had confessed to being guilty of rape. At his trial the deter-
mination of the voluntariness of his confession was made by the
jury. He appealed on the ground that this procedure violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Held, affirmed.
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the due
process clause as requiring the judge to make a determination of the
voluntariness of the confession. However, Georgia law, which vests
the trial judge with unquestionable power to review the case after
conviction and to set aside the verdict if he is not satisfied with it,
completely fulfills this requirement. Justice Almand, dissenting,
stated that the procedure followed in this case is exactly the same
as the procedure held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Sims v. State, 144 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 1965).
It is clear under the fourteenth amendment that a conviction
cannot stand if it was based on evidence which included an invol-
untary confession. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
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Involuntary confessions are forbidden because of the likelihood that
they are untrustworthy and because of the interest of society in
protecting the individual's freedom of will. This freedom is sacri-
ficed when an agency of the government wrings a confession out
of an accused. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960).
There is a "deep rooted feeling that the police must obey the law
while enforcing the law ... ." Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
320-21 (1959). The consequence of basing a conviction on a coerced
confession is always reversal. This is true although there was
evidence apart from the confession sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict. Metlzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Re-
sponsibility Between Judge and jury, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 318
(1954).
The three basic procedural methods which have been used to
determine the voluntariness of a confession are the orthodox, the
Massachusetts and the New York rules. Under the orthodox pro-
cedure the judge determines the voluntariness of confessions. If
the judge considers the confession voluntary, it will then be sub-
mitted to the jury. The jury considers all the circumstances sur-
rounding the confession to determine whether the confession is true,
but they have no power to reject the confession as involuntary.
3 WiGmom, EvmEcE § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
Under the Massachusetts procedure the judge, after hearing all
the evidence, decides whether the confession was voluntary. The
judge makes a determination of the voluntariness issue even though
there are factual issues over which reasonable men could differ. If
the judge finds the confession voluntary, he admits it into evidence.
However, the jury also must find the confession voluntary before
it can consider the reliability of the confession. Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368,378-79 (1964).
Under the New York procedure the judge makes only a prelim-
inary determination as to the voluntariness of a confession. If the
judge finds that under no circumstances could the confession be
deemed voluntary, then he must exclude the confession from
evidence. If there is a factual dispute concerning the voluntariness
over which reasonable men could differ, the judge must leave the
question of voluntariness to the jury. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 172 (1953). Futhermore, the trial judge may set aside the
jury's verdict if he believes it to be against the weight of the evi-
dence. N.Y. CODE Cmir. PNoc. §§ 465, 528.
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Although the orthodox, Massachusetts and New York procedures
are the basic procedures for determining the voluntariness of a
confession, not every state and federal jurisdiction can be neatly
classified as following one particular procedure Many times it is
difficult to ascertain from appellate court opinions which procedure
the court is following. Moreover, some state courts rule differently
on different occasions. Jackson v. Denno, supra at 378, n.9.
Recently, the New York procedure has been under attack on the
theory that it violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This procedure was first attacked in Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156 (1953). The main issue which confronted the United
States Supreme Court in Stein was whether the New York pro-
cedure failed to meet the standard of fair play which the Constitu-
tion demands. It was recognized that this procedure might be
unfair to defendants because one does not know whether the jury
made the critical determination regarding the voluntariness or
whether they simply ignored the issue. However, the Supreme
Court held the New York procedure constitutional. The holding
was justified by a statement of alternate assumptions. The jury
either (1) found the confession voluntary and properly relied on it
or (2) deemed the confession involuntary and ignored it. 33 Foii-
HAm L. REv. 86 (1965).
The landmark case of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963),
expressly overruled the Stein case and held the New York pro-
cedure unconstitutional. In Jackson v. Denno the defendant robbed
a hotel and shot a police officer. The defendant was wounded and
taken to a hospital. Shortly thereafter he admitted having shot the
policeman. After he had lost a great deal of blood and had been
administered various drugs, he admitted that he had fired the first
shot. The trial court used the New York procedure to determine
the voluntariness of the confession. Because the factual issues sur-
rounding the confession were such that reasonable men could differ,
the issue as to voluntariness was submitted to the jury. The jury
found the defendant guilty of first degree murder.
In determining not to follow Stein, the United States Supreme
Court observed that the most obvious objection to the reasoning in
the Stein case was that the jury would fail completely to consider
the issue of voluntariness. However, assuming this problem could
be remedied, the Stein decision was still wrong. It was wrong be-
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cause it ignored the danger in which the defendant's rights are
placed under either of the alternative assumptions. The assumption
that the jury found the confession voluntary and properly relied on
it is not satisfactory because it overlooks the possibility that the
jury did not arrive at this conclusion objectively. Under the New
York procedure approved in Stein the jury hears all the evidence,
i.e., the evidence on the issue of voluntariness and on the issue of
truthfulness. Consequently, evidence that the confession is true may
influence the determination of whether that confession is voluntary.
It is unfair to let other matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt
influence the jury in the determination of the voluntariness of a
confession. Jackson v. Denno, supra at 381-87.
The alternate assumption in Stein, that the jury found the con-
fession involuntary and properly disregarded it, is equally unsatis-
factory. Mr. Justice White pointed out that if the jury finds the
confession involuntary they are still likely to rely on it because of
its trustworthiness. It is difficult for a juror to exclude the truthful-
ness of an involuntary confession from his mind when determining
the defendant's guilt. Jackson v. Denno, supra at 388.
Furthermore, the New York procedure presents a problem con-
cerning the record on appeal. Under this procedure there is no
record of how the jury resolved the coercion issue. The record does
not show whether, "the jury found the confession voluntary and
relied upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored it." Jackson
v. Denno, supra at 379. Because of this shortcoming a petitioner
does not know on which point to concentrate his attack when
appealing the decision.
The Massachusetts and the orthodox procedures were approved
in Jackson v. Denno. In both of these procedures the determination
of voluntariness is made before the jury hears any evidence. The
jury does consider voluntariness under the Massachusetts rule; how-
ever, they do not hear a confession unless the judge first determines
it to have been voluntary. Furthermore, when either of these two
procedures is used, the judge's finding on voluntariness will be on
record. In effect, these two methods remove the possibility of
undue prejudice against the defendant.
The dissenting opinions seriously challenged the rationale of the
majority. Mr. -Justice Black emphasized that to disregard the in-
voluntariness of a confession because it is trustworthy is human
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nature. This temptation haunts judges as well as jurors. Jackson v.
Denno, supra at 402. Furthermore, Justice Black questioned the
constitutional bases on which the majority rested the decision.
Jackson v. Denno, supra at 407. His concept of due process was
apparently much narrower than that of the majority of the justices.
He maintained that the Supreme Court does not have the power to
strike down a state trial procedure merely because that procedure is
unfair.
Mr. Justice Harlan agreed with Mr. Justice Black's idea that the
Supreme Court should not strike down time tested state procedures.
Jackson v. Denno, supra at 427. He noted also that the majority's
distrust of juries was in contrast with Supreme Court decisions in
the past; the United States Supreme Court has rejected arguments
that juries do or may disregard their instructions. Opper v. United
States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). To illustrate his point Justice Harlan
set forth an intricate and complicated instruction presented to the
jury in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), which the appellant
argued may have confused the jury. The Supreme Court refused
to recognize the possibility of the jury's inadequacy in Leland.
Justice Harlan observed that in Jackson v. Denno the facts and
instructions were far more simple. Jackson v. Denno, supra at
430-33.
The interpretation of Jackson v. Denno in the principal case is
not consistent with the expanding concept of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The procedure used in the prin-
cipal case has the same weaknesses inherent in the New York pro-
cedure. In fact, the appendix to Justice Black's dissent indicated
that Georgia employed the New York procedure. Jackson v.
Denno, supra at 415.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme and Superior Courts
of Pennsylvania have recently adopted a rule of criminal procedure,
effective September 15, 1965, which is designed to follow and imple-
ment the decision in Jackson v. Denno. PA. R. CtmM. P. 323. The
rule requires an advance determination by the court of the ad-
missibility of a confession. If the court decides that the confession
is admissible, then the issues of both voluntariness and credibility
are submitted to the jury for determination of guilt.
The West Virginia courts will not have to change their procedure
for the determination of voluntariness. The procedure applied in
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West Virginia is the same as the othodox rule which was expressly
approved in Jackson v. Denno. The West Virginia Supreme Court
has held that, before admitting a confession into evidence, a trial
judge must determine from the evidence that the confession was
voluntarily made. State v. Vance, 146 W. Va. 925, 124 S.E.2d 252
(1962); State v. Brady, 104 W. Va. 523, 140 S.E. 546 (1927).
Menis Elbert Ketchum, H1
Criminal Law-Due Process and the Statute of Limitations
D was arrested seven months after he allegedly sold narcotics
to an undercover policeman. At the trial D was convicted of a
narcotic's violation solely upon the testimony of the undercover
policeman. D denied the sale but was unable to find any other
defense as he remembered nothing at all of what he had done on
the day the sale allegedly occured. The undercover policeman
needed notes to refresh his memory. The court held that D was
denied due process because the long delay between the time the
prosecution's case was completed and the time D was arrested
deprived D of a fair opportunity to defend even though prosecution
commenced before the statute of limitations expired. Ross v. United
States, 349 F.2d 210 (D. C. Cir. 1965).
The court appears to have set a precedent in rejecting the time
set forth in the statute of limitations where constitutional guar-
antees are involved. The court holds in effect that the maximum
time set forth in the statute for commencing prosecution may be
diminished where there would be a denial of due process if the
statute of limitations were literally applied.
The problems that faced the court in the principal case arise
from a method of police investigation into the so-called "victimless"
crimes. The crimes are generally narcotics offenses, prostitution,
sodomy, liquor sales and gambling. The method often used by
police in detecting these cimes involves an undercover man-either
a plain clothes policeman or a police informer. The undercover man
tries to establish himself in an area where he suspects these crimes
are being committed. Once established and trusted, he hopes that
someone will invite him to commit one of the crimes, or that he
may witness the crimes as they are committed.
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